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Abstract This paper assesses the degree of equality of educational opportunities across 
Argentina’s public primary schools. The main finding is that there are inequalities between 
jurisdictions, but even greater inequalities within them, suggesting the existence of serious 
problems in the distribution of resources at the sub-national level. Following the 
recommendations of the specialized literature, estimates of school quality and measures of 
disparity in educational opportunity were calculated. While school differences were found 
across provinces, even greater discrepancies were found among public schools located 
within provinces, which are responsible for the provision of primary education. Most 
importantly, inequality among public schools is found to be associated with factors that are 
considered socially unacceptable, such as the student’s socio-economic status even among 
schools financed by the same governmental unit.  
Keywords: Public education; inequality; equality of opportunity; Argentina. 
 
Igualdad de oportunidades educativas en las escuelas primarias públicas 
en Argentina 
Resumen: El presente trabajo analiza el grado de igualdad de oportunidades 
educativas en las escuelas primarias púbicas en Argentina y se encuentra que fallas 
a nivel sub-nacional pueden ser las culpables de su falta. Siguiendo la literatura, se 
estimaron medidas de calidad de las escuelas y se calculó la disparidad de las 
oportunidades educativas. Mientras que se encontraron diferencias entre 
provincias, todavía mayores diferencias se encontraron entre escuelas públicas 
localizadas en la misma provincia, que son las responsables de proveer la 
educación básica. Más importante aún, la desigualdad entre escuelas públicas se 
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encuentra asociada a factores que se consideran socialmente inaceptables, como la 
situación socio-económica del estudiante, incluso entre escuelas financiadas por la 
misma unidad gubernamental.  
Palabras-clave: educación pública; desigualdad; igualdad de oportunidades; 
Argentina. 
 
Igualdade de oportunidades educacionais nas escolas primárias públicas 
em Argentina  
Resumo: Este trabalho avalia o grau de igualdade de oportunidades educacionais 
entre as escolas primárias públicas da Argentina e descobre que falhas ao nível 
sub-nacional pode ser o culpado por sua falta. Seguindo a literatura, são 
calculadas as estimativas de qualidade da escola e as medidas de disparidade de 
oportunidades educacionais. Embora as diferenças escolares fossem encontradas 
entre as províncias, ainda maiores discrepâncias foram encontradas entre as 
escolas públicas localizadas em províncias, que são responsáveis pela oferta de 
educação primária. Mais importante ainda, a desigualdade entre escolas públicas é 
encontrado para ser associada a fatores que são considerados socialmente 
inaceitáveis, como a situação sócio-econômica do aluno, mesmo entre escolas 
financiadas pela mesma unidade governamental. 
Palavras-chave: educação pública, desigualdade, igualdade de oportunidades; 
Argentina. 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the main objectives of Argentina’s Federal Education Law of 1993, as 
stated in section 8, was to provide equality of educational opportunities. In the economic 
jargon, and borrowing Roemer’s words, “to level the playing field.”1 In a world of perfectly 
equal opportunities differences in outcomes would arise from differences in efforts. 
Disparities derived from different amounts of effort would not be considered 
discriminatory or unfair. 
The main purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which the objective of 
equality of educational opportunities is being fulfilled and point to where the main failings 
lie. Though some studies have shown that there is great disparity in quality among public 
schools in Argentina (Llach and Schumacher, 2005 and Llach and Gigaglia, 2003), they are 
inconclusive as to the extent of inequalities as well as their specific sources. 
In order to evaluate equality of educational opportunities, the quality of schools is 
estimated using three different indexes proposed by the literature. These capture the 
physical, human and social dimensions of schools. The distribution of these factors among 
public schools was found to be very unequal. Great disparities were found between 
provinces, governmental units that support primary education since 1970, but even bigger 
ones between schools financed by the same governmental unit, where, a priori, we would 
not have expected to find any.  Moreover, these inequalities were found to be positively 
linked with socially unacceptable conditions, such as family income.  
The following section reviews the literature on school quality, the measurement of 
schooling inequalities, and situations considered socially unacceptable. Section three 
provides a description of the data as well as an outline of the way the different indexes of 
school quality and socioeconomic status (SES) were constructed. Section four presents the 
methodology and estimation strategy, section five the results and the conclusion is section 
six. 
                                                 
1 Roemer (2005) p.1. 
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Empirical approaches to measuring educational quality, inequalities and finding 
unfair situations 
Formal schooling is an important determinant of the skills of an individual and 
plays a decisive role in determining his/her standard of living as adults (Glewwe, 2002). 
While other factors also contribute, including parents’, friends’ and individual abilities, 
schools have a special role since they are the ones most directly affected by public policies. 
A variety of motivations lead societies to provide strong support to schooling, including 
economic considerations, political participation, a sense of social justice, and a desire for 
general development of society. Almost all governments in the world assume a substantial 
role in providing education for their citizens (Hanushek, 2004).  
An equal opportunity policy, as Roemer (2005) defines it,  
[I]s an intervention (e.g., the provision of resources by state agency) that makes 
it the case that all those who expend the same degree of effort end up with the 
same outcome, regardless of their circumstances. Thus, the equal opportunity 
policy ‘levels the playing field’, in the sense of compensating persons for their 
deficits in circumstances, so that, finally, only effort counts with regard 
outcome achievement.2 
On school quality 
Most empirical studies of human capital have concentrated on the quantity of 
schooling attained by individuals, ignoring the quality differences, in most cases, due to lack 
of information regarding quality.3 This focus, questioned among others by Hanushek 
(2004), contrasts sharply with public policy considerations that consider almost exclusively 
school quality issues.  One public policy exception is The Education for All initiative, a 
global commitment in which 164 governments pledged at the World Education Forum in 
Dakar, 2000, to increase years of schooling by 2015 and provide quality basic education for 
all children, youths and adults. Yet, much of this policy making tended to downplay the 
issues of quality (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007).  
In line with the experience of other developing countries, the years of schooling of 
the argentine population rose considerably after 1974. The proportion of people without 
instruction or with incomplete elementary instruction was 37% of the total population in 
1974 and dropped to only 9% in 2002. The percentage of the population that had 
completed only primary school fell from 37% to 28%, and as a consequence, secondary 
schooling and post-secondary education rose considerably. People with secondary 
incomplete studies rose from 11% to 18%, secondary graduates from 9% to 19%, 
incomplete post-secondary studies from 3% to 10% and college graduates from 3% to 
16%. This large increase of the number of years of schooling was a great first step, the goal 
of universal primary education was also achieved because net enrolment rate has been over 
99% for primary school children (SEDLAC, 2012) for the lasts decades. The next one is to 
improve quality. 
There are several ways to measure school quality. In fact, Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2007) state that one of the challenges to understanding the impact of quality 
differences in human capital has been simply knowing how to measure quality. Adams 
(1993) identifies approximately fifty ways to measuring school quality while the OECD 
(2005) comes up with six. In the present study we will evaluate the availability of school 
                                                 
2 Roemer 2005, pp.3-4. 
3 One of the first studies to focus on quality as well as quantity was Barro and Lee (1996), who 
worked on data from individual governments as compiled by UNESCO and other sources. The 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) carried out the first assessment in 2000, and 
regarding Argentina, the first ONEE took place in 1993.   
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resources, their quality and their distribution among the public primary schools in the 
country, in this sense, we will use Krueger’s (1999) “education production function” which 
defines school quality by the quality of inputs to the education system. Following Llach and 
Schumacher (2005) three indexes of school quality were constructed. They capture the 
physical, human and social dimensions of school quality. The details of the indexes used 
can be found in section 3.2.  
On the measurement of schooling inequalities 
In addition to evaluating the quality of the schools, its distribution among schools is 
also very relevant. Berne and Stiefel (1984)4 analyze alternative measures of what they call 
horizontal equity, also known as equal treatment of equals. In this sense, perfect horizontal 
equity would exist when every school in the distribution receives the same school quality. 
Horizontal equity measures basically capture the spread or dispersion in a distribution and 
assess how far the distribution is from perfect equality. Although no list of horizontal 
equity measures is exhaustive, they provide a comprehensive list: range, restricted range, 
federal range ratio, relative mean deviation, McLoone index, variance, coefficient of 
variation, standard deviation of logarithms, Gini coefficient, Theil’s measure and 
Atkinson’s index (Berne and Stiefel, 1984, pp. 19-21). A great number of studies use the 
coefficient of variation as the measure to evaluate horizontal equity. These include Berne 
and Stiefel (1994), Iatarola and Stiefel (2003), and Roza et al. (2007) among others. Murray 
et al. (1998) construct four measures of the within-state distribution of education 
expenditures –the Theil index, the Gini coefficient, the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
spending at the 95th percentile to spending at the 5th percentile, and the coefficient of 
variation. Studies interested in decomposing inequality mainly use the Theil inequality 
index. Ram (1995) studies inequalities in access to education using the population weighted 
Theil index to measure the amount of inter-country and intra-country inequality of school 
enrolments, and Murray et al. (1998) use also the Theil index to show the disparity in 
student spending between and within states.   
In the case of Argentina, it is relevant to disentangle whether the source of 
educational inequality is found in differences among provinces (the governmental units 
responsible for the provision of basic education), or differences within each province. This 
would shed light on the relative importance of each of the causes of the inequality, and 
help determine whether the main problem is one of provincial administration of 
educational resources or an incomplete compensatory policy from the National 
Government. For this reason, it is convenient to develop a summary measure of school 
quality that can be disaggregated into its constituent components. This is achieved by 
applying the inequality decomposition analysis to population subgroups (Cowell and 
Jenkins, 1995). As Bourguignon (1979) states, the decomposability of an inequality measure 
implies a sort of additivity, so as to express it as the sum of inequality existing between 
subgroups of a population and a kind of “weighted average” of the inequality within those 
groups, although the “weights” used in this averaging do not necessarily sum up to one. In 
this sense, an inequality measure is said to be additively decomposable if it can be 
expressed as the sum of a “within group” inequality term and a “between groups” 
inequality term (Shorrocks, 1980). 
In the present case, decomposability is a much desired property, though not any 
decomposable measure is a satisfactory index. For example, the variance is not neutral with 
respect to a scale change of the whole distribution, which would be a desirable property of 
                                                 
4 Define three principles of educational equity: horizontal equity, vertical equity and equality of 
opportunity. In the present study vertical equity or, as it is also called “unequal treatment of 
unequals”, will not be analyzed due to lack of information. 
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an inequality measure. Another property that might be expected from an inequality 
measure is that it decreases with any transfer from rich to less rich schools (Pigou-Dalton 
condition or strong principle of transfers). Bourguignon (1979) investigated all inequality 
measures that are decomposable while satisfying a set of basic requirements: they are 
continuous and differentiable (the Gini coefficient, widely used to measure inequality, is 
not differentiable, therefore, is not an appropriate measure to decompose (Cowell, 2000)), 
symmetric, mean independent (also called income-homogeneous), satisfy the symmetry 
axiom for population and satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition. The continuity requirement 
means that an infinitesimal change in the value of a school quality may be expected to 
produce only an infinitesimal change in the inequality measure. The differentiability 
condition leads to the elimination of a wide family of measures in which school qualities 
enter with their rank in the whole distribution and which are not differentiable everywhere 
(Gini coefficient, interquantiles mean incomes ratios, etc.). These measures are generally 
not decomposable. The symmetry requirement is also called the anonymity rule. The mean 
independence property implies that the measure is invariant when all school quality indexes 
are multiplied by the same scalar, and in the same way, the symmetry axiom for population, 
which requires that the inequality of a distribution be the same to that of the distribution 
obtained by replicating any number of times each school quality, a kind of population-zero-
homogeneity. 
Decomposable inequality measures will differ by the weighting systems. The two 
most obvious candidates are “income-weighted” and “population-weighted” decomposable 
measures. Interestingly, Bourguignon found only one inequality measure consistent with 
each concept of decomposability and satisfying the list of convenient properties: the Theil 
Entropy coefficient (T) and the average logarithm of relative incomes (L), which as he 
pointed out, is the same as Henri Theil’s (1967, pp. 126-127) population-weighted index of 
inequality. Going one step further, Shorrocks (1980) points out that “when inequality 
measures are used to assess the contribution of one particular factor to total inequality, 
another problem arises in the different interpretations that can be given to statements like 
‘X percent of inequality is due to Y’.”5 Only when the decomposition coefficients do not 
depend on the subgroup means will the ambiguities disappear. For this reason, the most 
satisfactory decomposable measure, allowing total inequality to be unambiguously split into 
the contribution due to differences between subgroups is the population-weighted index of 
inequality, in which the decomposition coefficients are precisely the population shares 
(ng/n). “[It allows] total inequality to be unambiguously split into the contribution due to 
differences between subgroups and the contribution due to inequality within each 
subgroup g=1,…,G, in such a way that total inequality is the sum of these G+1 
contributions.”6 
On situations socially considered unacceptable or unfair 
There is a great consensus in considering an individual’s educational level and basic 
health status important factors in determining her set of opportunities (Gasparini, 2002). In 
Argentina, the National Education Law (2006) states that knowledge and education are 
public goods and personal and social rights guaranteed by the Government. And as a way 
to guarantee equity for all the inhabitants of the Nation, they should be free, of good 
quality, and available to everyone.  
In order to assert that the existing inequality is inequitable, it should be 
corroborated that its main source is socially unacceptable (Gasparini, 2002). For example, 
disparity in educational opportunities among private schools may not be considered 
                                                 
5 Shorrocks 1980, p. 624. 
6 Shorrocks 1980, p. 625. 
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inequitable if it stems from a disparity in fees charged. The same inequality among public 
schools may be unacceptable, because the governmental unit that finances education 
should assign the resources in such a way as to compensate for existing disparities and 
provide equal treatment of equals7.  
In order to measure equality of educational opportunities, relationship measures 
(Berne and Stiefel, 1984) are generally used to quantify the degree of association between 
characteristics that are considered illegitimate or unacceptable (Gasparini, 2002). And 
though there are a great number of available measures, regression based measures are the 
most common. They are popular not only because they are based on certain statistical 
principles, but also because there are several possible equal opportunity measures that can 
be derived from regression analysis. Berne and Stiefel (1984, pp. 27-32) present eleven 
regression-based relationship measures, of four types: correlation, slopes, elasticities and 
adjusted relationship measures. Several studies use the regression based analysis to search 
for educational inequities; among others we can find Berne and Stiefel (1994), Iatarola and 
Stiefel (2003), Llach and Schumacher (2005) and Rubenstein et al. (2007).  
According to Iatarola and Stiefel (2003), equality of opportunity can be 
conceptualized in two ways. A neutral formulation posits that equal opportunity exists if 
there is a lack of association between per student resources and characteristics associated 
with historically disadvantaged groups (Berne and Stiefel, 1984), while an affirmative action 
formulation posits that equal opportunity is achieved if there is a positive association in the 
relationship (Roemer, 2005). 
Regarding empirical studies about the state of education around the world, a very 
complete report is UNESCO (2012). It states that many young people around the world -
especially the disadvantaged- are leaving school without the skills they need to thrive in 
society and find decent jobs. As well as upsetting young people’s hopes, these education 
failures are jeopardizing equitable economic growth and social cohesion. A valuable book 
edited by Fernando Reimers (2000), offers a complete contribution referred to Latin 
America, and the inequality of schools along the social ladder, and López (2005) also 
analyses the situation for some Latin American countries. Among the works referred to 
Argentina those of Braslavsky (1985) and Bravslavsky and Filmus (1987) can be mentioned. 
Based on a small, non-random sample, Braslavsky and Filmus confirmed not only the 
inequality of schools but also the existence of differential educational trucks, depending on 
students’ SES levels, demonstrating that disparities in schools and social segregation were 
not only present at elementary level but also extended to intermediate level. Veleda (2009) 
analyses four factors that determine education segregation, one exogenous (spatial 
segregation) and three endogenous (state regulation, competition among schools, family 
decision process to choose school) and tries to find policy recommendations to reduce 
school segregation.   
In the case under study we evaluate the extent in which school quality, defined in 
terms of inputs, is related to the level of income of the students. A priori, a strong 
correlation between socioeconomic status of the students and opportunities would be 
considered inequitable. Though it should be analysed thoroughly since the existence of 
cooperative associations could be enhancing this correlation, and their influence should not 
be considered unacceptable. These associations are generally managed by parents of 
students of the school, and collect funds from students to invest them in improving the 
quality of the service provided by the school. Therefore, the inequalities derived from the 
existence of these associations resemble those related to the fees private schools charge, 
and not a direct consequence of public policy or the administration of the schools. 
                                                 
7 In Argentina some private schools not only charge fees but also receive state support.  
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In the following section a description of the database can be found. Next we will 
proceed by constructing measures of the schools’ quality, subsequently by measuring the 
discrepancies that can be found, and once this data is obtained, we will evaluate how unfair 
the situations are.  
Data 
Description of the data base 
Our primary source of information on schools, teachers and student characteristics 
is the Operativo Nacional de Evaluación Educativa (National Educational Assessment) or 
ONEE for the year 2000 which is the only census of schools elaborated by the Argentine 
National Ministry of Education, therefore the only source of micro data for all the schools 
in the country. In addition, the National Household Expenditure Survey (Encuesta 
Nacional de Gastos de Hogares or ENGH for the years 1996-1997) was selected to 
provide income and consumption patterns in order to calculate the SES of the children in 
the sample, needed to detect unfair situations, in which school quality is positively 
associated to the level of income of the household.  
An original database was constructed as a way to integrate the outcomes of the 
survey of GBE sixth-grade students with those obtained from the surveys of directors and 
teachers for the same year. The three data bases were integrated using the section or 
classroom as the unit of measurement. Therefore, each entry in the database represents a 
school section, and shows the characteristics and opinions of the director of the school, the 
teachers’ features and judgments and the average of the students’ outcomes and 
characteristics.  
Argentina is a federal country organized in 24 autonomous political jurisdictions (23 
provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires). Responsibility for pre-primary and 
primary education has been decentralized at the provincial level since 1970; when the 
National Government, by Law 17.878 and Law 18.586, transferred the elementary schools 
to the provinces and the Municipality of the City of Buenos Aires. This process was 
completed in 1978. Though schools were transferred to the provinces, educational equity 
remained the responsibility of the National Government. As such, compensatory federal 
funds were mandated in order to guarantee educational equity. Both free public schools 
and private institutions that charge fees to students supply education (Berlinski and Galiani, 
2005). Unfortunately, one of the provinces (Neuquén) did not participate of the census, 
and therefore, we will work with 23 units. And, as our concern is the unacceptable sources 
of educational inequality, we will focus the study on the public schools, due to the fact that 
the private ones may differ in quality because of the different fees they charge.  
Construction of the school quality indexes 
School quality will be measured through three indexes measuring, respectively, 
physical, human and social capital of each school. This means that school quality will be 
defined by its inputs. The indexes were constructed using a methodology that has been 
applied in other studies in the field (Llach and Schumacher, 2005 and Llach and Gigaglia, 
2003). The physical capital index is divided in two sub indexes, corresponding to the 
construction and functional characteristics of the buildings, which includes the quality, 
functionality and state of repair of the building, electricity, classrooms, furniture, library, 
courtyards and bathrooms; and the quality and availability of teaching materials. The 
human capital index measures the quality of the directors and teachers of the schools and is 
constructed on three main issues: professional and school experience, qualifications and 
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training and aptitude for the job. Experience quantifies the seniority in a particular school, 
the number of years in teaching, the contractual status (full time, replacement, etc.), and the 
mode of access to the position. Qualification and training refers to the qualifications 
acquired via formal training and education, and access was constructed on the analysis of 
the working methodology. Finally, social capital refers to the social networks that exist in 
the schools. It is divided in three sub indexes, interaction with the community, interaction 
with the students’ parents, and the internal organization, which include school autonomy, 
the relationship among the teaching staff, and the relationship of the director and teachers 
with the students. Although the three measures were constructed on the basis of the 
ONEE, the different dimensions measured clearly have different degrees of subjectivity. 
While physical capital, years of experience and qualifications are quantifiable and verifiable, 
measures of aptitude for the job and relationships within schools have a significantly 
subjective component. This is an element to bear in mind when analysing the results. 
The Socio Economic Status Index (SES)  
A measure of the students’ SES is required in order to identify situations that are 
considered socially unacceptable, as discussed in section 1.3 above. But the SES cannot be 
determined directly since the ONEE data base does not measure income or consumption, 
i.e., the most widely used measures to quantify welfare status. In order to overcome this 
matter, we have followed Schumacher (2003) and Elbers et al. (2003) and used an 
alternative data set that contains income, and used as explanatory variables a list of 
determinants also found in the ONEE. Once this model has been estimated, it is used to 
predict income using the information contained in the ONEE database. With the purpose 
of estimating the spending pattern of the households, the purchasing habits regarding 
durable goods and public services corresponding to the households of different SES were 
studied as well as how the level of education of the head of household affected it. The 
chosen survey was the National Household Expenditure Survey because it has similar 
questions to the ones corresponding to the ONEE as well as information regarding 
households’ income and consumption for the different regions in Argentina. It also has the 
advantage of representing the whole population of the country, where many surveys only 
include urban populations. 
The regression equation was as follows: 
 
ln(ingpcf) = a0 + a1(edup) + a2(edusi) + a3(edus) + a4(eduui) + a5(eduu) + a6(car) + 
+a7(electricity) + a8(telephone) + a9(stove) + a10(gas) + a11(air conditioning) + a12(hot 
water) + a13(toilet) + a14(water) + a15(2 members) + a16(3 members) + +a17(4 members) + 
a18(5 members) + a19(6 members) + a20(7 members or more) 
 
The first five explanatory variables are intended to represent, using dummy 
variables, the maximum educational level attained by the head of the family: completed 
primary (edup), incomplete secondary (edusi), completed secondary (edus), incomplete 
tertiary (eduui) and completed tertiary (eduu). The subsequent nine variables represent the 
possession of durable goods and utilities. Finally, the last six variables represent the size of 
each household, only one of the last six variables is assigned the value “1” with the 
remaining valued at “0”, depending on the number of members in the household.  
Estimations of the households’ expenditure patterns for each of the regions in the 
country (GBA, NEA, NOA, Cuyo, Pampeana and Patagonia) were obtained, which means, 
that a specific value was assigned to each of the coefficients for each of the regions. Later, 
with the estimated coefficients, the explanatory variables were replaced by the different 
vectors provided by the ONEE database for each of the regions, and in this way, a 
prediction of the logarithm of per capita household income of each student surveyed was 
obtained, taking into account the expenditure pattern usual of his place of origin. Finally, 
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9 
the values were rescaled without altering the relative positions in order to assign zero value 
to the minimum and one hundred to the maximum. This was done by subtracting the 
minimum value from each prediction, dividing by the difference between the maximum 
and the minimum values and multiplying by one hundred. It is worth mentioning that the 
SES has an economic dimension; it is the prediction of the logarithm of the household per 
capita income, and also a cultural dimension, captured by the level of education of the 
household head and the number of members in the family. It is expected that a higher SES 
would represent both greater financial capacity of the household to invest in the student’s 
education and a culture within the household that is more conducive to studying.  
Methodology and estimation strategy 
To assess the relevance of the various factors discussed in the previous section on 
educational equity, we adapt the decomposition methodology and the regression analysis to 
our case. 
Decomposition methodology 
The basic intuition of the decomposition methodology, is that given a specific 
partition (the provinces in this case) and a suitable inequality measure, overall 
inequality, can be written as some function of within-group inequality for the partition 
W(and between-group inequality B(; the former refers to inequalities within each 
province and reflects the assignment of resources by the provincial government; the latter 
reflects an inefficient or incomplete compensatory policy by the National Government, 
thus 
 
     BWf ,  
(1) 
 
In principle, this functional breakdown would specify the proportion of inequality 
‘accounted for’ by between-group inequality with reference to a particular population 
partition , and thus, the inequality ‘explained’ by the population partition  (Cowell and 
Jenkins, 1995). In the present case, it would refer to differences across provinces.  
In order to implement such indexes, a suitable inequality measure is needed. Such 
measure should at least guarantee that the decomposition is consistent for all logically 
possible partitions . If we also require that the measure be continuous and differentiable, 
symmetric, mean independent (also called income-homogeneous), satisfy the symmetry 
axiom for population and the strong principle of transfers, the only relevant measure is the 
generalised entropy index (Cowell, 2000). 
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(2) 
Expression (2) specifies a family of inequality contour maps with given mean and 
population. The parameter c indexes the members of the family and can be assigned any 
real value, specifying a high positive value of c yields a ‘top sensitive’ index that is 
particularly sensitive to changes in the upper tail of the distribution (Cowell, 2000). In 
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particular, when c=2 the index corresponds to the square of the coefficient of variation. I1 
is the Theil index and I0 is the population weighted entropy index, also proposed by Theil 
(Shorrocks, 1980). I0 and I1 are particular family members for which the within-group 
component weights sum to one, being I0 the most satisfactory decomposable measure, 
allowing total inequality to be unambiguously split into the contribution due to differences 
between and within subgroups (Shorrocks, 1980). 
We may in principle assign overall inequality to between group and within-group 
components, but there are two logically separate and unavoidable difficulties that have to 
be confronted when doing this; the cardinalisation issue and the definition of between 
group inequality (Cowell and Jenkins, 1995). Regarding the first one, it is worth mentioning 
that although inequality within a given group is a purely ordinal concept, the 
decomposition by component subgroups is contingent upon the specific cardinalisation of 
the inequality measure. And regarding the latter, it is important to bear in mind that since 
an inequality measure is defined on the sets of arbitrary dimensions, the concept of 
inequality within any subgroup is straightforward; selecting a measure for the whole 
population also provides a measure for any group in However the method of 
aggregation of these intra-group inequalities into a single number representing the within-
group inequality component for  is not self-evident. Two different meanings have been 
given to this concept: the between-group component can be interpreted as inequality of the 
group means, or inequality of the group representative values (Cowell and Jenkins, 1995). 
The equation used for the decomposition is: 
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(3) 
 
The first term is the between groups (g) inequality and the second term is the 
within groups component. G specifies the group, i the observation (in the present case, the 
school section), y the variable under study, w the weight, refers to the mean of y and N to 
the number of observations of the population or group. This decomposition technique 
outlined was applied to the SES index and to the three schools’ capitals indexes and the 
results are presented in section four.  
Regression analysis 
The quality of education plays a particular role in determining a person’s future 
opportunity set and its distribution concerns policy makers and society in general. Though 
an equal distribution of education is a desirable outcome, inequality in its provision is not 
necessarily unfair. Only those differences in outcomes that are due to differences in 
unacceptable variables would be considered unfair (Gasparini, 2002). 
In order to evaluate the equality of educational opportunities, multiple regression 
analysis was used to measure the extent to which characteristics of students or schools 
explain the variation in the schools’ resources. As the neutral formulation of the equal 
opportunity principle states, perfect equity would be defined as the absence of a 
relationship between the object of study, school quality (SQ), and a certain characteristic 
considered illegitimate. The most common illegitimate characteristic used is a measure of 
the students’ wealth, in our case it would be the SES, though other characteristics may also 
be considered illegitimate, such as being an immigrant (Inm) or a native student (NS). The 
variables corresponding to the presence of immigrants and of native students are dummy 
variables which were constructed on the response given by the directors of the schools. Inm 
has a value of 1 if there are recent immigrants at the school, zero if there are not; NS has a 
value or 1 if there are indigenous students, 0 if there are not, and both present missing 
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value if the director did not answer the question. The following regression for each 
jurisdiction (j) will be evaluated, being i the section of the school and  a constant for each 
jurisdiction.   
 
jijjijjijjij NSInmSESSQ    (4) 
 
Particular attention should be given to two different ways of measuring the 
relationship between the variables. The degree to which the variables move together can be 
analyzed through their correlation, or through the goodness of fit of the whole model (the 
coefficient of determination, which is also the square of the simple correlation, and 
indicates how much of the variability of the dependant variable is explained by the model). 
The magnitude of the relationship between the variables can be assessed with the slope or 
the elasticity.  
The results obtained with the multiple regression technique for both of these 
measures are presented in the section 4.3. In particular, the coefficient of determination of 
the model and the slopes of the variables considered illegitimate are shown.  
Results 
This section reports the different measures of school quality and the distribution of 
educational opportunities. It begins by presenting the mean and coefficients of variation 
for the SES and the school capital; next, the decomposition of the inequality found is 
presented, and finally, the equality of educational opportunities is offered.  
1.1 Schooling Inequalities  
As a first approach to estimating schooling inequality, the coefficients of variation 
for the three measures of school capital and for the SES can be seen in Table 1. The 
coefficient of variation is defined as: 


vc
 
, where  is the standard deviation and  is 
the mean. 
As can be observed in Table 1, there is a great disparity in the number of sections 
in the jurisdictions, Buenos Aires (3,188), Córdoba (1,030), Tierra del Fuego (71), Santa 
Cruz (100) and Catamarca (106). Nonetheless the highest coefficients of variation of the 
measures of school capital are not only in the larger jurisdictions like Buenos Aires 
province or Cordoba, but also in the smallest ones like Catamarca, La Rioja, Jujuy and San 
Luis. Disparity appears not to be related to size.8  
 Also, it is quite noticeable that the capital most unequally distributed is the physical 
capital, despite the fact that it is the easiest to measure and to modify via a redistribution of 
resources.  
                                                 
8 Provinces differ not only in size, but also in their population, climate and productive and 
managerial capacity. 
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Table 1:  
Means and Coefficients of Variation corresponding to the school capital and to the SES index1 
  Obs. SES 
Physical 
Capital 
Human 
Capital Social Capital 
   cv  cv  cv  cv 
All Jurisdictions 11237 41.82 0.20 2.66 0.24 3.73 0.13 2.85 0.16 
City of Bs.As. 525 59.37 0.07 3.34 0.17 3.86 0.11 2.88 0.16 
Bs.As 3188 43.46 0.13 2.49 0.26 3.68 0.13 2.88 0.17 
Catamarca 106 40.87 0.13 2.39 0.22 3.41 0.11 2.64 0.18 
Córdoba 1030 43.87 0.13 2.89 0.21 3.92 0.10 2.96 0.13 
Corrientes 384 37.29 0.22 2.46 0.24 3.54 0.13 2.65 0.18 
Chaco 506 36.21 0.26 2.42 0.24 3.63 0.13 2.77 0.16 
Chubut 180 49.75 0.14 3.04 0.17 3.81 0.11 2.76 0.16 
Entre Ríos 440 41.22 0.16 2.59 0.23 3.43 0.14 2.71 0.17 
Formosa 245 33.72 0.26 2.25 0.24 3.54 0.12 2.67 0.15 
Jujuy 168 37.01 0.18 2.41 0.21 3.56 0.12 2.62 0.19 
La Pampa 208 46.71 0.11 3.33 0.17 3.65 0.12 2.91 0.13 
La Rioja 113 43.22 0.11 2.49 0.24 3.61 0.13 2.55 0.20 
Mendoza 586 40.39 0.16 2.89 0.21 3.86 0.13 2.98 0.15 
Misiones 563 36.25 0.23 2.46 0.20 3.64 0.13 2.86 0.15 
Río Negro 219 42.61 0.18 2.71 0.18 3.58 0.13 2.79 0.15 
Salta 469 37.38 0.20 2.59 0.21 3.86 0.12 2.83 0.16 
San Juan 276 38.74 0.16 2.66 0.18 3.90 0.11 3.01 0.12 
San Luis 156 40.22 0.15 2.78 0.22 3.94 0.10 2.95 0.14 
Santa Cruz 100 53.31 0.07 3.09 0.14 3.70 0.11 2.58 0.19 
Santa Fé 804 39.78 0.20 2.82 0.22 3.91 0.11 2.92 0.15 
Sgo.del Estero 361 33.15 0.25 2.34 0.23 3.60 0.16 2.76 0.16 
Tucumán 539 38.53 0.16 2.61 0.19 3.88 0.12 2.90 0.15 
Tierra del Fuego 71 54.92 0.07 3.35 0.10 3.54 0.11 2.39 0.22 
Source: Own estimation based on ONE 2000. 
1meancv: coefficient of variation. 
 
The coefficients of variation for the indicators of school quality range between 
12.9% (corresponding to human capital) and 24% (corresponding to physical capital) 
considering all jurisdictions. Therefore, the presence of inequalities is not just a feeling but 
a fact.  
The jurisdictions with the highest mean of physical capital tend to have it more 
equally distributed; this is the case for Tierra del Fuego, the City of Buenos Aires, Santa 
Cruz, Chubut and La Pampa. On the contrary, the ones with the lowest physical capital 
have greater disparities (Buenos Aires Province, Santiago del Estero, Chaco and Corrientes 
among others). Regarding the human capital, Santiago del Estero is the jurisdiction that 
presents the highest inequality (0.16) while San Luis and Cordoba the lowest (0.10). In what 
respects the social capital, the highest inequalities are found in Tierra del Fuego, La Rioja, 
Jujuy and Santa Cruz (with coefficients over 19%). Finally, the coefficients of variation for 
the SES of the students range from 6.8% (Santa Cruz) to 26.4% (Formosa), with, the 
poorer jurisdictions, in general, being the most unequally distributed. 
It is worth mentioning that with the exception of the poorest jurisdictions, Chaco, 
Misiones, Formosa and Santiago del Estero, at least one measure of school capital is more 
poorly distributed than the SES. This indicates that the schooling inequalities are even 
worse than the socioeconomic inequalities in most jurisdictions.  
Inequality decomposition  
After having a first approach to the problem, the following step is to study whether 
it is caused by poor provincial administration or by inefficient compensatory policy by the 
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national government. The decomposition of the inequalities between and within 
jurisdictions is presented in table 2 for the SES and the school capital.  
 
Table 2:  
Theil decomposition between and within jurisdictions 
SES Physical Capital 
Total Theil 0.021 100.0% Total Theil 0.030 100.0% 
Between groups Theil 0.008 37.0% Between groups Theil 0.005 15.8% 
Within group Theil 0.013 63.0% Within group Theil 0.025 84.2% 
      
Human Capital Social Capital 
Total Theil 0.009 100.0% Total Theil 0.014 100.0% 
Between groups Theil 0.001 8.5% Between groups Theil 0.001 5.0% 
Within group Theil 0.008 91.5% Within group Theil 0.013 95.0% 
Source: Own estimation based on ONE 2000. 
 
The decomposition of the Theil index showed that the majority of the schooling 
inequalities are explained by differences within the jurisdictions, more than 84% 
corresponds to it. In a word, a poor quality school does not necessarily belong to a poor 
province.  
As can be observed in table 2, the physical capital is the most unequally distributed 
(0.03), even worse than the SES (0.021). But, as can be seen, the inequality between 
jurisdictions is worse in the case of the SES (0.008), than that of the physical capital (0.005) 
and human and social capitals (0.001). This could suggest a certain effect of the 
compensatory policy from the National Government regarding educational quality between 
jurisdictions. In other words, there are greater economic disparities than educational quality 
disparities between jurisdictions; this suggests there is some mechanism providing more 
educational resources to the poorer ones.  
At the same time, it should be noted that the largest inequalities are within each of 
the provinces, which would suggest that it is the provincial administration that is failing. A 
priori, we would not have expected to find inequalities between schools financed by the 
same governmental unit. In the case of the physical capital, 84.2% of the inequality found is 
explained by differences within the provinces, while for the human and social capitals, 
more than 90% corresponds to differences inside the provinces. Therefore, improving the 
distribution of the school quality within each jurisdiction is essential to getting closer to the 
objective of horizontal educational equity.  
Then, we focused the study in the evaluation of the particular situation of each 
jurisdiction. We studied the horizontal equity with the coefficient of variation and the Theil 
index. The ones that present the worst scenario are Buenos Aires province, Corrientes, 
Chaco, Entre Rios and La Rioja. All these are the worst ranked in the distribution of the 
three measures of school quality, either by the coefficient of variation as by the Theil index 
(see table 3). The best ones in this respect are Córdoba, Chubut, La Pampa, San Juan, San 
Luis and Tucumán. It is worth mentioning that the size of the jurisdictions is quite 
different, but that large and small jurisdictions are in both groups. Buenos Aires province is 
the largest one while Córdoba is the second largest one. And La Rioja and San Luis are 
among the smallest jurisdictions. 
A special case is Tierra del Fuego, which presents a very high value of SES and 
quite equally distributed resources, the highest value for physical capital and the most 
equally distributed, but the lowest and worst distributed social capital. A similar situation 
can be seen in Santa Cruz. Though, as it has been mentioned, this capital is to a certain 
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extent affected by personal opinions. At the same time, Tierra del Fuego is the youngest 
jurisdiction, and both provinces have the fewer amount of schools and sections. An 
opposite situation can be seen in the case of San Juan and San Luis, which present much 
better results for the human and social capitals than for the physical capital and the SES. 
Except for Chaco, Formosa, Misiones and Santiago del Estero, the physical capital is the 
worst distributed, even worse than the SES, as was already seen with the cv. 
 
Table 3:  
Rankings for the Theil index and the amount of school capital in each jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction 
Theil 
SES 
SES 
Theil 
Physical 
Capital 
Physical 
Capital 
Theil 
Human 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
Theil 
Social 
Capital 
Social 
Capital 
City of Bs.As.  23 23 21 22 15 16 9 16 
Bs.As. 18 17 1 9 5 13 5 15 
Catamarca 17 13 13 3 18 1 7 5 
Córdoba 16 18 14 18 21 22 21 21 
Corrientes 5 6 3 6 7 3 6 6 
Chaco 2 3 4 5 4 10 14 11 
Chubut 15 20 19 19 19 15 12 9 
Entre Ríos 12 14 6 11 2 2 8 8 
Formosa 1 2 5 1 12 5 16 7 
Jujuy 8 5 12 4 10 6 2 4 
La Pampa 19 19 20 21 14 12 22 18 
La Rioja 20 16 2 8 6 9 3 2 
Mendoza 11 12 9 17 3 17 11 22 
Misiones 4 4 15 7 8 11 17 14 
Río Negro 9 15 17 14 9 7 19 12 
Salta 6 7 10 10 11 18 10 13 
San Juan 10 9 18 13 17 20 23 23 
San Luis 14 11 11 15 23 23 20 20 
Santa Cruz 22 21 22 20 20 14 4 3 
Santa Fé 7 10 8 16 16 21 15 19 
Sgo.del Estero 3 1 7 2 1 8 13 10 
Tucumán 13 8 16 12 13 19 18 17 
Tierra del 
Fuego 21 22 23 23 22 4 1 1 
Ranking Theil: 1: Most unequal 23: Most equal. Ranking capitals and SES: 1: Lowest value 23: 
Highest value. Source: Own estimation based on ONE 2000 and ENGH. 
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Table 4:  
Absolute values for the Theil index and the amount of school capital in each jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction 
Theil 
SES 
Mean 
SES 
Theil 
Physical 
Capital 
Mean 
Physical 
Capital 
Theil 
Human 
Capital 
Mean 
Human 
Capital 
Theil 
Social 
Capital 
Mean 
Social 
Capital 
City of Bs.As. 0.002 59.37 0.015 3.34 0.007 3.86 0.014 2.88 
Bs.As. 0.008 43.46 0.034 2.49 0.009 3.68 0.016 2.88 
Catamarca 0.009 40.87 0.023 2.39 0.006 3.41 0.016 2.64 
Córdoba 0.009 43.87 0.023 2.89 0.006 3.92 0.009 2.96 
Corrientes 0.025 37.29 0.030 2.46 0.009 3.54 0.016 2.65 
Chaco 0.035 36.21 0.030 2.42 0.009 3.63 0.012 2.76 
Chubut 0.009 49.75 0.015 3.04 0.006 3.81 0.013 2.76 
Entre Ríos 0.013 41.22 0.027 2.60 0.010 3.43 0.015 2.71 
Formosa 0.037 33.72 0.029 2.25 0.007 3.54 0.012 2.66 
Jujuy 0.017 37.01 0.023 2.41 0.008 3.56 0.020 2.62 
La Pampa 0.006 46.71 0.015 3.33 0.007 3.65 0.009 2.91 
La Rioja 0.006 43.22 0.031 2.49 0.009 3.61 0.020 2.55 
Mendoza 0.013 40.39 0.024 2.89 0.009 3.86 0.013 2.98 
Misiones 0.026 36.25 0.021 2.46 0.009 3.64 0.012 2.86 
Río Negro 0.017 42.61 0.017 2.71 0.008 3.58 0.011 2.79 
Salta 0.022 37.38 0.023 2.59 0.007 3.86 0.013 2.83 
San Juan 0.014 38.74 0.017 2.66 0.007 3.90 0.008 3.01 
San Luis 0.011 40.22 0.023 2.78 0.005 3.94 0.011 2.95 
Santa Cruz 0.002 53.31 0.010 3.09 0.006 3.70 0.018 2.58 
Santa Fé 0.020 39.78 0.024 2.82 0.007 3.91 0.012 2.92 
Sgo.del Estero 0.032 33.15 0.026 2.34 0.014 3.60 0.013 2.76 
Tucumán 0.012 38.53 0.018 2.61 0.007 3.88 0.011 2.90 
Tierra del Fuego 0.003 54.92 0.005 3.35 0.005 3.54 0.024 2.39 
Source: Own estimation based on ONE 2000 and ENGH. 
Equality of educational opportunities  
As stated in section 1.3, in order to assert that the existing inequality is inequitable, 
it should be corroborated that its main source is socially unacceptable (Gasparini, 2002). 
Inequality among public schools may be unacceptable, because the governmental unit that 
finances education should assign the resources in such a way as to compensate for existing 
disparities and provide equal treatment of equals. Moreover, the National Government 
should compensate the poorer jurisdictions in order to allow them provide good quality 
education.  
Following the methodology described in section 3.2 we evaluate its degree of 
association with the factors considered unacceptable in order to determine unfair 
situations. That is to say, we relate the amount of school capital to the SES, the presence of 
immigrants and native students (variables considered illegitimate as determinants of school 
quality). 
The coefficients of determination corresponding to the multiple regressions for the 
school capital and the three variables considered unacceptable: SES, immigrants and native 
students can be found in table 5. They indicate how much of the variability in the school 
capital is explained by characteristics considered unfair. In some jurisdictions, like the City 
of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires Province, Cordoba, Corrientes, Chaco, Chubut, Entre Rios, 
Formosa, Mendoza, San Juan, San Luis, Santa Fe and Tucuman, the regressions 
corresponding to the physical capital are the ones with the highest coefficient of 
determination. This would suggest that in these jurisdictions there is less equality of 
physical capital than there is of social or human capital. This could be related to the way 
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provincial expenditure in education is distributed, as Paz and Jimenez (2011) mention, in 
many provinces more than 90% of expenditure in education corresponds to teachers, 
directors and other school staff salaries.9 Catamarca, Jujuy, La Pampa, La Rioja, Tierra del 
Fuego, Santa Cruz and Rio Negro present the highest fit in the regression corresponding to 
the social capital, while Misiones, Salta and Santiago del Estero show the highest fit in the 
human capital regression. Corrientes and La Rioja present all the coefficients of 
determination under 0.05, which would indicate that in all of them, there is not a strong 
association between the variables considered unacceptable and the school capital. 
Table 5 presents the outputs of the regressions regarding the Equality of 
Educational Opportunities. 
 
                                                 
9 In addition, this difference could be due to the fact that in some schools, cooperative associations 
raise funds in order to maintain the physical capital. 
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Table 5:  
Equality of Educational Opportunities 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Dependant variable Physical capital Human capital Social capital 
 No.obs. 
Pupils’ 
SES 
Immigrants 
Native 
students 
Intercept R2 
Pupils’ 
SES 
Immigrants 
Native 
students 
Intercept R2 
Pupils’ 
SES 
Immigrants 
Native 
students 
Intercept R2 
All Juris. 9198 0.031*** -0.085*** -0.038 1.415 0.171 0.009*** -0.033*** 0.006 3.378 0.028 0.008*** -0.031*** -0.040** 2.530 0.028 
                 
Cap. Fed 453 0.044*** -0.017 -0.080 0.816 0.117 0.000 0.071* 0.070 3.829 0.013 0.011** -0.031 -0.029 2.242 0.016 
Bs.As 2643 0.039*** -0.051** -0.052 0.849 0.131 0.012*** 0.016 -0.013 3.175 0.022 0.020*** 0.002 -0.029 2.038 0.063 
Catamarca 83 0.027*** 0.471 0.090 1.247 0.131 -0.009 0.301 -0.504 3.754 0.022 -0.027*** 1.121** -1.760*** 3.733 0.144 
Córdoba 884 0.039*** -0.056 0.220 1.212 0.139 0.012*** -0.029 0.083 3.421 0.027 0.015*** -0.013 0.109 2.315 0.047 
Corrientes 279 0.013*** -0.246 0.361 1.981 0.041 0.005 0.042 0.023 3.389 0.009 0.003 -0.010 0.072 2.572 0.004 
Chaco 411 0.017*** 0.147 -0.164** 1.842 0.112 0.012*** -0.259** 0.099* 3.211 0.063 0.005** -0.044 0.019 2.634 0.010 
Chubut 144 0.002 -0.160 -0.235** 3.049 0.094 -0.003 0.101 -0.078 3.969 0.012 0.007 0.037 -0.088 2.444 0.033 
Entre Ríos 371 0.022*** -0.170 -0.049 1.718 0.069 0.002 0.230* -0.365 3.391 0.011 0.012*** 0.019 -0.519** 2.238 0.054 
Formosa 201 0.025*** -0.017 0.039 1.401 0.174 0.013*** -0.156* 0.195** 3.069 0.104 0.015*** -0.062 0.067 2.146 0.107 
Jujuy 107 0.002 0.245** 0.021 2.264 0.045 0.009 -0.208** -0.020 3.343 0.062 0.023*** -0.182* -0.036 1.899 0.151 
La Pampa 170 0.029*** 0.197 0.195 1.990 0.070 0.028*** 0.425*** -0.081 2.354 0.142 0.028*** 0.243* 0.002 1.609 0.148 
La Rioja 82 0.014 -0.071 (dropped) 1.920 0.017 0.009 -0.117 (dropped) 3.289 0.014 0.008 -0.336 (dropped) 2.291 0.036 
Mendoza 477 0.019*** -0.125* 0.213* 2.149 0.056 0.010*** -0.057 0.002 3.494 0.020 0.013*** 0.053 0.209** 2.464 0.055 
Misiones 472 0.010*** -0.112 -0.125 2.106 0.034 0.016*** -0.058 -0.043 3.089 0.078 0.009*** -0.018 0.024 2.538 0.036 
Río Negro 181 0.003 0.134 -0.016 2.574 0.015 0.006 -0.019 0.180** 3.293 0.045 0.009** 0.164** 0.060 2.392 0.073 
Salta 343 0.016*** 0.196*** -0.082 1.965 0.076 0.016*** -0.058 -0.062 3.309 0.083 0.011*** -0.055 0.045 2.419 0.030 
San Juan 221 0.015*** 0.147 (dropped) 2.055 0.071 0.012*** 0.119 (dropped) 3.440 0.058 0.011*** -0.018 (dropped) 2.598 0.055 
San Luis 124 0.025** 0.231 (dropped) 1.762 0.072 -0.003 0.054 (dropped) 4.055 0.004 0.003 0.090 (dropped) 2.786 0.007 
Santa Cruz 72 0.008 0.061 -0.008 2.675 0.009 0.013 0.153 0.933** 3.002 0.080 0.040*** 0.202 0.662 0.395 0.111 
Santa Fé 674 0.023*** 0.091 -0.153* 1.937 0.109 0.005** 0.002 -0.031 3.744 0.009 0.012*** -0.066 0.110*** 2.486 0.048 
Sgo.del Est. 294 0.021*** 0.630*** 0.023 1.585 0.169 0.032*** 0.117 0.680* 2.582 0.204 0.009*** 0.378** -0.211 2.461 0.057 
Tucumán 448 0.032*** -0.192** 0.334* 1.389 0.158 0.012*** -0.184** 0.133 3.435 0.034 0.014*** 0.054 0.041 2.380 0.042 
T. del Fuego 64 0.014 -0.179** (dropped) 2.682 0.095 0.001 -0.187** (dropped) 3.585 0.066 0.033** -0.307** (dropped) 0.660 0.140 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. †The cases when the variable is dropped correspond to those in which none of the directors of 
the schools answered that there are native students. Source: Own estimation based on ONEE 2000 and ENGH.   
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In column/model (i), the provinces that present the highest coefficients of 
determination are Formosa, Santiago del Estero, Tucuman, Cordoba, Buenos Aires, 
Catamarca, Chaco, Santa Fe and the City of Buenos Aires. The highest slopes values of the 
SES and significantly different from zero are those corresponding to Formosa, Tucuman, 
Cordoba, Buenos Aires Province, Catamarca, the City of Buenos Aires and La Pampa. The 
SES has a significant and positive effect on the level of physical capital in many 
jurisdictions with the exception of Chubut, Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego, Rio Negro, Jujuy 
and La Rioja. This confirms that in most of the provinces there is not equality of 
educational opportunities, because there is a significant relationship between the level of 
physical capital and the wealth of the students, measured through the SES. The exceptions 
are Jujuy, La Rioja, Rio Negro and Santa Cruz where we cannot reject that all the 
coefficients corresponding to the independent variables are equal to zero (F-Statistic), 
indicating that the present inequalities cannot be attributed to unacceptable reasons. In 
these cases, though there is inequality, we cannot conclude that it is unfair. Regarding the 
other two variables that would also be considered unacceptable as determinants of the 
schools’ capitals, the presence of immigrants and native students; the outcomes presented 
in the table suggest that their presence is significant in very few provinces and that their 
effect on the physical capital goes in both directions, either positive or negative. Therefore, 
in most of the cases we cannot conclude that the inequality found is unfair to immigrants 
or native students. 
In the case of the human capital (column/model (ii)) approximately half of the 
jurisdictions present a coefficient of the SES positive and significantly different from zero.  
The presence of native students is significant on the determination of the amount of 
human capital in very few provinces. In all of them, the effect is positive, not negative, 
which would have been considered unacceptable. On the contrary, the presence of 
immigrants, when it is significantly different from zero, is sometimes positive, as in the 
case of the City of Buenos Aires, Entre Rios and La Pampa, and negative in the cases of 
Tucuman, Tierra del Fuego, Chubut, Jujuy, Formosa and all the jurisdictions considered as 
a whole. We cannot reject the equality of opportunity regarding the human capital in the 
following jurisdictions: City of Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Corrientes, Chubut, Entre Rios, 
La Rioja, San Luis, Santa Cruz and Santa Fe (The F-Statistic is not significantly different 
from zero). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the inequality found in the human capital 
of these jurisdictions is unfair. 
In the case of the social capital (column/model (iii)), the absence of equality of 
educational opportunities can be confirmed in most of the jurisdictions. Catamarca is a 
special case, in which there appears to be a negative association between the level of SES 
and of capital, suggesting the existence of a pro-poor distribution. The presence of native 
students is significant in very few provinces, and its impact on the social capital is 
sometimes positive (Santa Fe and Mendoza), and sometimes negative (Entre Rios, 
Catamarca and all the jurisdictions considered as a whole). A similar situation is observed 
in the case of immigrants, in Catamarca, Santiago del Estero and Rio Negro their presence 
has a positive and significant impact on the social capital, while in Tierra del Fuego, on the 
contrary, the effect is negative.  
Tierra del Fuego is the only province in which the presence of immigrants has a 
negative and significant effect on the three types of capitals of the schools, and Santiago 
del Estero and La Pampa are the only ones in which this variable has a positive effect on 
the three capitals (though in the case of the human capital it is not significantly different 
from zero for Santiago del Estero and in the case of the physical capital for La Pampa). 
As was already mentioned, public schools quite often have cooperative associations 
which are generally managed by parents of students of the school and recollect funds from 
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the students to invest them in improving the quality of the service provided by the school. 
Their action could affect the amount of physical capital the school can buy or afford to 
repair, or provide funds to hire more acknowledged teachers (human capital). Regarding 
the social capital, as it is constructed taking into account the relationship between schools 
and parents; it also takes into account if these cooperative associations are constituted in 
the school. Therefore, it cannot be used to test if it is a determinant of the social capital, 
because we already know it is.  
Incorporating the presence of these cooperative associations in order to check 
their impact on the physical and human capitals of the schools in most cases did not alter 
significantly the results previously found. Three variables considered unacceptable (SES, 
immigrants and native students) were tested as determinants of the school capital, and one 
considered acceptable (the presence of cooperative associations). These results are 
presented in table 6. The presence of a cooperative association is a significant determinant 
of the physical capital in Río Negro, Formosa, Mendoza, Misiones and Santa Cruz, though 
in the latter case, it has a negative impact. In the case of Río Negro, it is the only element 
that presents a coefficient significantly different from zero indicating that all the disparity 
in the distribution of this capital would be due to acceptable sources. In fact, the model 
which was not significant without incorporating this variable, now it is. In Mendoza and 
Misiones, though the coefficients regarding the unacceptable factors are still significant, 
some are slightly smaller than when these cooperative associations are not included, but in 
Formosa, the coefficient regarding the SES, is even bigger than in the previous analysis. As 
regards the human capital, the cooperative associations have a significant impact for the 
cases of Buenos Aires province, Formosa, San Juan, San Luis, Tucumán and Chubut, 
though in the latter case presents a negative effect. In the case of San Luis, it is the only 
determinant with a coefficient significantly different from zero, indicating that the 
inequality in the human capital would be explained by acceptable factors, and again, the 
model that was not significant now is. In the rest of the provinces, the results regarding the 
other coefficients are mixed; in the case of Buenos Aires province, the coefficients 
corresponding to unacceptable sources remained the same, on the contrary, in Formosa 
and San Juan the coefficients were increased, and in the case of Tucumán, the one 
corresponding to the SES was reduced, but the corresponding to the presence of 
immigrants was increased. 
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Table 6:  
Equality of Educational Opportunities, including cooperative associations 
 (i) 
Physical capital 
(ii) 
Human capital 
Dependant variable 
 
No.obs. 
Pupils’ 
SES 
Immigrants 
Native 
students 
Cooperative 
Associations 
Intercept R2 
Pupils’ 
SES 
Immigrants 
Native 
students 
Cooperative 
Associations 
Intercept R2 
All Jurisdictions 9157 0.031*** -0.086*** -0.030 0.042 1.377 0.171 0.009*** -0.035*** 0.012 0.130*** 3.250 0.032 
              
Cap. Fed 449 0.045*** -0.025 -0.081 0.641 0.124 0.124 0.003 0.037 0.073 0.195 3.500 0.008 
Bs.As 2636 0.039*** -0.048** -0.036 0.169 0.689 0.131 0.012*** 0.019 0.002 0.246*** 2.946 0.025 
Catamarca 81 0.027*** 0.432 0.248 0.150 1.112 0.149 -0.007 0.265 -0.431 0.042 3.662 0.020 
Córdoba 884 0.039*** -0.056 0.217 0.104 1.117 0.140 0.012*** -0.029 0.084 -0.020 3.440 0.027 
Corrientes 277 0.011*** -0.248 0.345 0.175 1.864 0.046 0.005 0.043 0.019 0.049 3.348 0.010 
Chaco 410 0.018*** 0.201 -0.174*** 0.262 1.570 0.117 0.013*** -0.211* 0.092* 0.227 2.971 0.068 
Chubut 144 0.001 -0.149 -0.248** -0.199 3.261 0.102 -0.003 0.116 -0.096 -0.276* 4.264 0.035 
Entre Ríos 370 0.022*** -0.173 -0.049 -0.022 1.746 0.069 0.001 0.224* -0.362 0.160 3.265 0.015 
Formosa 201 0.028*** -0.051 0.082 0.499** 0.822 0.200 0.016*** -0.181** 0.228*** 0.375** 2.634 0.127 
Jujuy 107 0.001 0.246** 0.022 0.029 2.245 0.046 0.008 -0.205** -0.014 0.174 3.228 0.077 
La Pampa 164 0.024*** 0.141 0.146 0.029 2.233 0.062 0.024*** 0.373*** -0.096 0.209 2.375 0.147 
La Rioja 82 0.012 -0.039 (dropped) 0.253 1.803 0.043 0.008 -0.098 (dropped) 0.155 3.218 0.030 
Mendoza 477 0.018*** -0.143** 0.206* 0.269*** 1.972 0.078 0.010*** -0.057 0.002 0.006 3.490 0.020 
Misiones 468 0.010*** -0.103 -0.137 0.334** 1.793 0.047 0.016*** -0.044 -0.023 0.052 3.032 0.080 
Río Negro 177 0.000 0.087 0.065 0.219*** 2.540 0.061 0.005 -0.025 0.183** 0.092 3.298 0.047 
Salta 339 0.016*** 0.199*** -0.077 0.153 1.814 0.077 0.016*** -0.057 -0.064 -0.105 3.413 0.082 
San Juan 221 0.016*** 0.149 (dropped) -0.020 2.070 0.071 0.012*** 0.132 (dropped) -0.150* 3.556 0.072 
San Luis 124 0.026*** 0.217 (dropped) 0.224 1.511 0.079 -0.001 0.030 (dropped) 0.391** 3.617 0.056 
Santa Cruz 72 0.016 0.077 0.100 -0.333*** 2.515 0.108 0.009 0.147 0.887** 0.142 3.070 0.095 
Santa Fé 674 0.023*** 0.091 -0.153* (dropped) 1.937 0.109 0.005** 0.002 -0.031 (dropped) 3.744 0.009 
Sgo.del Est. 291 0.021*** 0.648*** 0.027 -0.616 2.222 0.168 0.032*** 0.109 0.679* 0.048 2.519 0.207 
Tucumán 445 0.032*** -0.194** 0.341* 0.066 1.342 0.160 0.010*** -0.188** 0.154 0.239*** 3.283 0.050 
T. del Fuego 64 0.010 -0.167** (dropped) 0.119 2.804 0.124 -0.002 -0.173* (dropped) 0.127 3.716 0.095 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. †The cases when the variable is dropped correspond to those in which none of the directors of 
the schools answered that there are native students. Source: Own estimation based on ONEE 2000 and ENGH. 
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In other words, the regression analysis showed that in most cases there is a positive 
association which indicates the lack of equality of educational opportunities. With the exception of 
Santiago del Estero, the coefficient of determination is never higher than 20%, and in most of the 
cases is fewer than 10%. Formosa and Santiago del Estero not only have the poorest students, but 
also horizontal inequality and a lack of equality of educational opportunities. Two cases that are 
distinctive are La Rioja and La Pampa, the first one has bad marks regarding horizontal inequality, 
while we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of educational opportunities. This means that we 
could not find evidence that the distribution of the school quality is related to unacceptable factors. 
On the contrary, La Pampa has good indicators about horizontal equality, while the regression 
analysis shows that almost 15% of the distribution of the schools capitals can be explained by 
unacceptable factors. 
Conclusions 
The need for empirical work on the measurement of equality of educational opportunities in 
the Argentine public system has often been stressed. This paper takes a step in that direction by 
presenting three measures of school quality, their distribution, the decomposition of the inequality in 
between and within jurisdictions, and the degree of association between the school quality and a set 
of variables considered unacceptable. 
The coefficients of variation for the indicators of school quality range between 12.9% 
(corresponding to human capital) and 24% (corresponding to physical capital) considering all 
jurisdictions. Therefore, the presence of inequalities is not just a feeling but a fact. After having a 
first approach to the problem, the following step was to try to unravel where the main problem was. 
In that sense, we studied whether it was one of provincial administration or of inefficient 
compensatory policy by the national government. The decomposition of the Theil index showed 
that the majority of the schooling inequalities are explained by differences within the jurisdictions, 
more than 84% corresponds to it. In a word, a poor quality school does not necessarily belong to a 
poor province.10 Had the municipalities (smaller governmental units) been responsible to finance 
education, disparities between schools in the same province would have been expected, but this was 
not the case, since schools with great disparities in inputs are financed by the same governmental 
unit. 
Then, we focused the study in the evaluation of the particular situation of each jurisdiction. 
We studied the horizontal equity with the coefficient of variation and the Theil index. The ones that 
present the worst scenario are Buenos Aires province, Corrientes, Chaco, Entre Rios and La Rioja. 
All these are the worst ranked in the distribution of the three measures of school quality, either by 
the coefficient of variation as by the Theil index. The best ones in this respect are Córdoba, Chubut, 
La Pampa, San Juan, San Luis and Tucuman. It is worth mentioning that the size of the jurisdictions 
is quite different, but that large and small jurisdictions are in both groups. Buenos Aires province is 
the largest one while Córdoba is the second largest one. And La Rioja and San Luis are among the 
smallest jurisdictions.  
Next, the degree of association between the quality of the schools and those variables 
considered unacceptable was studied to determine the degree of equality of educational 
                                                 
10 Other studies also find intradistrict inequalities; Roza et al. (2007) find great disparities in spending among 
the public schools financed by the same district, and Iatarola and Stiefel, (2003) also find inequalities in the 
provision of resources as well as a lack of equitable distribution of performance; in particular, they analyze the 
district of New York City. 
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opportunities. In this sense, the regression analysis showed that in most cases there is a positive 
association which indicates the lack of equality of educational opportunities. With the exception of 
Santiago del Estero, the coefficient of determination is never higher than 20%, and in most of the 
cases is fewer than 10%. Formosa and Santiago del Estero present a worrisome situation. Not only 
they have the poorest students, but also they have horizontal inequality and a lack of equality of 
educational opportunities. Two cases that are distinctive are La Rioja and La Pampa, the first one 
has bad marks regarding horizontal inequality, while we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of 
educational opportunities. This means that we could not find evidence that the distribution of the 
school quality is related to unacceptable factors. On the contrary, La Pampa has good indicators 
about horizontal equality, while the regression analysis shows that almost 15% of the distribution of 
the schools capitals can be explained by unacceptable factors. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that though we could corroborate the lack of horizontal 
equity and of equality of educational opportunities, even among the public schools financed by the 
same jurisdiction, the inequality of the school capital between jurisdictions is less than the inequality 
of the SES between jurisdiction, this could mean that there is a certain equalizing policy regarding 
educational quality to compensate to the poorer jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the school capital within 
jurisdictions is more unequally distributed than the SES.  
As further research, it would be interesting to analyze the situation within each province in 
order to have a better understanding of the results found. Exploring the diversities that coexist in 
each province, their traditions, their productive matrix and the possibilities they have to access 
public resources will be helpful to better understand the problem and provide policy 
recommendations. 
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